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Abstract—Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) allows
clients with limited resources to outsource their expensive ML
tasks to powerful servers. Despite the huge benefits, current
MLaaS solutions still lack strong assurances on: 1) service
correctness (i.e., whether the MLaaS works as expected); 2)
trustworthy accounting (i.e., whether the bill for the MLaaS re-
source consumption is correctly accounted); 3) fair payment (i.e.,
whether a client gets the entire MLaaS result before making the
payment). Without these assurances, unfaithful service providers
can return improperly-executed ML task results or partially-
trained ML models while asking for over-claimed rewards.
Moreover, it is hard to argue for wide adoption of MLaaS to
both the client and the service provider, especially in the open
market without a trusted third party.
In this paper, we present VeriML, a novel and efficient
framework to bring integrity assurances and fair payments to
MLaaS. With VeriML, clients can be assured that ML tasks
are correctly executed on an untrusted server and the resource
consumption claimed by the service provider equals to the
actual workload. We strategically use succinct non-interactive
arguments of knowledge (SNARK) on randomly-selected itera-
tions during the ML training phase for efficiency with tunable
probabilistic assurance. We also develop multiple ML-specific
optimizations to the arithmetic circuit required by SNARK. Our
system implements six common algorithms: linear regression,
logistic regression, neural network, support vector machine, K-
means and decision tree. The experimental results have validated
the practical performance of VeriML.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning (ML) has been widely used in a variety
of fields such as disease diagnosis, risk prediction, and pattern
recognition. Since ML tasks often tackle with massive data,
especially in the training procedure, they require servers with
strong computational capabilities. As a result, Machine Learn-
ing as a Service (MLaaS) has become a promising service
paradigm that enables weak clients to train ML models or
compute predictions in powerful cloud infrastructures.
Despite the well-understood benefits, there exist many se-
rious concerns regarding MLaaS practices. For wider adoption
of MLaaS, especially in the open market without a trusted third
party, we argue that the following three assurances are among
the most important key desirables that MLaaS must satisfy.
- Service correctness: The client needs to be ensured that
the ML tasks done by the service provider must work as
intended, as if they were done in-house, and always produce
correct ML predictions or correct trained ML models.
- Trustworthy accounting: In existing commercial MLaaS
platforms, the bill is normally based on the consumed com-
puting resources [1], [2]. Thus, the lack of full transparency
at the service provider demands a strong assurance that the
resource consumption claimed by the service provider indeed
corresponds to the actual workload.
- Fair payment: The client should not obtain anything
about the final MLaaS result (e.g., partial ML prediction result,
sub-optimally trained ML models, etc.) prior to the payment.
The fairness of exchange between the client’s payment and the
MLaaS result must be guaranteed.
Without these assurances, unfaithful service providers
could return improperly-executed ML task results or partially-
trained ML models while asking for over-claimed rewards.
When designing schemes with strong assurance, we have
to take into account all of the requirements together, so as
to defeat sophisticated yet economically-incentivized attacks.
For example, the workload to train a model usually cannot
be determined in advance since when the training converges
is usually unpredictable. The convergence depends on the
training data set, the learning parameter setting, convergence
conditions, and random factors in the nature of model training.
In this case, the server may claim that it has executed 10K
iterations to train a model, but in fact it may have only
executed 1K iterations. The client can only observe that the
model is “well-formed”, i.e., its dimension is consistent to the
requirement, but doesn’t know if such a model is actually
produced by the 10K iterations. Besides, a malicious server
may also return inaccurate results by using a simpler model
with fewer parameters, or even generating them randomly.
Therefore, verifying the correctness of the result as well as
trustworthy accounting is vital and highly desirable.
In the literature, Verifiable Computation (VC) is a powerful
cryptographic building block which aims to verify the output
of a deterministic function. The worker can produce a proof
of his computation by representing the function as a circuit.
An early attempt [3] invoked a common VC technique called
interactive proof protocol to verify the prediction results of
neural networks. Yet, it does not address the cheating problem
in MLaaS. Firstly, although the VC technique can provide the
zero-knowledge property, the server needs to reveal the results
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to the client for verification, which violates our premise of
fair exchange. Secondly, expressing the training process as a
circuit straightforwardly is inefficient, due to the large number
of training iterations and input variables. Moreover, the matrix
computations and non-linear functions in ML algorithms are
also expensive for a circuit.
Hence, our goal is to design a fair machine learning service
system which can ensure the correctness of the result with high
efficiency. To transform this high-level concern into a practical
system, we need to address three main challenges:
1) Because existing VC techniques need to express the
computation as a circuit, how to efficiently convert the
machine learning algorithms to circuits is crucial for
fast verification. We find that prior works in this regard
are all unsuitable for VC, since their methods focus on
the boolean circuit which is expensive in calculating
large numbers of multiplications [4], [5].
2) How to avoid the expensive cost when loading all
the iterations and input variables in the circuit? An
intuitive idea is to sample and verify a small part
of the iterations. However, naive sampling allows a
malicious server to only execute the sampled iterations
and ignore the remaining ones. Besides, due to the
sequential nature of the training, dependencies cross
training iterations must be taken into account to ensure
the correct check of the sampled iterations.
3) Ensuring that neither of the two parties can get ad-
vantages in the payment is essential to a practical
MLaaS. Introducing a third party has been proved
to be necessary, but this may cause additional trust
concerns. Therefore prior works have proposed using
blockchain to replace the third party [6], [7], [8].
However, directly invoking the VC technique in their
protocols still presents risks of violating our fair
exchange premise, where the training results from the
server need to be revealed to the client for verification.
In this paper, we present VeriML, a practical outsourced
machine learning framework, which can achieve integrity
assurance and fair payment in training ML models, and detect
misbehaviors with high probability. Different from prior arts on
verifiable computation, the client of VeriML can be assured of
not only correct execution of ML tasks on the untrusted server,
but also the fact that the claimed resource consumption by the
service provider indeed corresponds to the actual workload.
Unlike the prior method in [3], we build VeriML by leveraging
the generic VC technique–succinct non-interactive arguments
of knowledge (SNARK), for its lower computation and com-
munication costs for the client, better expressiveness, and zero-
knowledge property [9], [10]. Rather than directly applying
SNARK to the entire ML task that often yields impractical
costs, we focus on using SNARK only for randomly-selected
individual iterative training procedures of ML for efficiency
with tuneable probabilistic assurance. To this end, we design
a new commit-and-prove protocol, which avoids the expensive
computation cost in proving large numbers of loop iterations
by sampling. Its correctness is ensured by our commitment
design that preserves complex dependencies between different
iterations without information leakage.
As case studies of VeriML, we focus on six typical machine
learning algorithms: linear regression, logistic regression, neu-
ral network, SVM, K-Means and decision tree. To reduce the
computation cost in generating the proofs, we propose multiple
optimizations to construct more efficient arithmetic circuits
required by SNARK. To the best of our knowledge, VeriML
is the first solution that achieves fairness and correctness in
outsourced machine learning services. Our contributions can
be summarized as follows:
• We present VeriML, the first outsourced machine
learning system that can exchange results of a paid
service fairly and detect computation misbehaviors
with high probability.
• To adapt machine learning algorithms to the VC
technique, we design multiple circuit-friendly opti-
mizations to verify expensive operations.
• We develop a new commit-and-prove protocol that
can verify the loop iterations when training machine
learning models with high efficiency. The detailed
theoretic analysis demonstrates that our scheme can
detect incorrect computations with high probability.
• We implement the VeriML framework with six pop-
ular ML algorithms: linear regression, logistic re-
gression, neural network, support vector machine, K-
means and decision tree on four real-world datasets
to demonstrate its performance. Our results show that
VeriML has a practical overhead as well as a negligible
accuracy loss in training.
II. RELATED WORK
Verifiable Computation. Generally, verifiable computation
is commonly used to verify the correctness of a function with-
out re-executing it. Previous studies have been focused on three
mainstreams: authenticated data structures (ADS), interactive
proofs (IPs) and succinct non-interactive arguments of knowl-
edge (SNARK). Among them, ADS has limited expressiveness
and lacks the zero-knowledge property, which can only process
certain computations such as polynomial evaluation [11] and
graph queries [12]. IPs are implemented based on the sum-
check protocol [13]. They can solve practical problems such
as multiplication matrix [14] and SQL query [15] with high
efficiency by avoiding expensive cryptographic operations. But
it is complex to convert an IP protocol to zero knowledge [16],
[17], [18] as needed by us. Compared to the above two
solutions, SNARK transforms an arbitrary polynomial-sized
function to a circuit to produce a short proof [19], [18], [20],
and its succinct property makes it very suitable for weak
clients. SNARK supports zero-knowledge proof, and has rich
expressiveness, while the high cost at the prover’s side can be
alleviated by the powerful cloud.
Recently, verification frameworks without using the generic
VC techniques have also been proposed. For example,
TrueBit [21] presents a novel peer-review idea which intro-
duces smart contract to judge the correctness of the results.
However, achieving the judge contract needs the blockchain
to store the trained models provided by multiple verifiers,
which may cause expensive costs. Using trusted execution
environment (TEE) such as Intel SGX is another orthogonal
2
attempt, which might be complementary to our protocol [22],
[23]. Using TEE demands additional trust of hardware vendors
in the first place, which does not always hold in MLaaS.
Besides, the limited size of the current enclave may cause ex-
pensive overhead in secure I/Os and encryptions/decryptions,
especially when addressing large-scale ML training tasks.
Privacy-preserving Machine Learning. Prior works on
privacy-preserving ML over encrypted data usually adopted
homomorphic encryption (HE) and garbled circuits (GCs).
These techniques are similar to VC as they also need to
represent the computation task. To our best knowledge, Cryp-
toNets [24] was the first to use neural networks to compute
predictions on encrypted data, and subsequent works following
this direction have further obtained results with improved per-
formance and/or accuracy [4], [5], [25]. The main difference
between these works and ours lies in designing the circuit
of machine learning algorithms, as we target at verifying the
result. The most related work to ours is SafetyNets [3], which
verified the correctness of the prediction of neural networks
using IPs. However, SafetyNets assumes that both the server
and the client are aware of the model and results during the
whole process (including prediction and verification), and does
not concern the training phase. Therefore, we cannot leverage
SafetyNets to implement the training process with integrity
assurances and/or realize the fair exchange.
Blockchain for Fairness. Recently using blockchain to
ensure fairness has been broadly studied. Most of the related
works aim to achieve fairness in multi-party computations by
using timed commitment and garbled circuits such as [26],
[27], [28], which are not suitable for our outsourced scenario.
So far, zero-knowledge contingent payment (ZKCP) [6] has
been accepted as an elegant solution that uses zero-knowledge
proof to ensure fairness in trading. Subsequent works [29],
[7], [8] discussed the drawbacks of ZKCP when the buyer is
malicious, or the purchase is digital service rather than goods,
and also the expensive computation cost of verifying a large
file. All the existing works still only concerned about how
to prove “if the seller holds something actually”, but without
ensuring “if what the seller holds is correct”.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Verifiable Computation (VC)
The verifiable computation (VC) technique aims to enable
a client C to verify the correctness of function F executed by
server S, with a given input x.
For an outsourced task, the client first runs KeyGen to
generate an evaluation key EKF , and a verification key V KF .
It then sends EKF to the server. The server executes Prove to
produce the proof pi, and sends pi and the result y to the client.
The client then checks the proof to verify the correctness of y
by executing Verify on the input x. The server and the client
are referred to as the prover and the verifier respectively.
Technically, the implementation of proof generation relies
on SNARK. Its key point is to encode the user-defined compu-
tations as quadratic programs. The basic flow is to first compile
the program from a high-level language to an arithmetic
circuit1, then use the circuit to construct a Quadratic Arithmetic
Program (QAP) which includes three sets of polynomials
A := {Ai(x)}mi=0, B := {Bi(x)}mi=0, C := {Ci(x)}mi=0
and a target polynomial Z(x). Defining polynomial P (x) =
A(x)B(x) − C(x), and Z(x) divides P (x) iff (c1, . . . , ck)
is a valid assignment for the circuit. The worker constructs
P (x) for the proof pi, and the client can verify the correctness
by checking if Z(x) can divide P (x). The zero-knowledge
property can be easily drawn into SNARK with a negligi-
ble overhead by choosing three additional random samples
δ1, δ2, δ3 and adding δ1Z(x), δ2Z(x), δ3Z(x) in the exponent
to A(x), B(x) and C(x), respectively. The reader may refer
to [30] for more details.
B. Fair Exchange Using Blockchain
In a computation service, the fair exchange problem is how
to guarantee that the transaction between a seller S and a
buyer B can be conducted fairly without one party cheating
the other [6], [7]. Fair exchange ensures: 1) the buyer who
pays a potentially malicious seller can obtain the results; 2)
the seller who delivers the results to a potentially malicious
buyer can get paid.
Traditionally, a trusted third party is proved to be indispens-
able in attaining fair exchange [31]. It is, however, usually a
serious limitation due to the lack of availability of a trusted
third party. The emergence of blockchain makes it possible to
achieve fair exchange without a trusted third party. Moreover,
it is desirable that B does not learn any knowledge about the
goods except for what S has published. To this end, Zero-
Knowledge Contingent Payment (ZKCP) combines the hash-
locked transaction and zero-knowledge proof technology. In
the protocol, S encrypts the file f with the symmetric key k,
and sends both c = Enck(f) and s = SHA256(k) with a proof
pi to B. If pi can pass the verification algorithm run by B, S
can prove that k is actually the key of c and the preimage
of s. Then B posts a transaction on the blockchain to pay to
anyone who can provide a preimage of s to obtain k, and S
can obtain the money by presenting the preimage.
IV. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Definition
In our system, a client C outsources a machine learning
task to a server S with a training dataset D. S trains a
prediction model M according to a certain ML algorithm and
parameters. After the training phase, C submits challenges r
to verify the execution of the learning algorithm, and in turn,
S returns the corresponding proofs pi without providing M .
If all the proofs can pass the verification, C is convinced that
S has faithfully completed the training, and then pays for the
ML service to obtain the model M . The core functionalities
of our scheme are defined below.
Definition 1. A fair machine learning service system allowing
a client C to outsource the training algorithm F and a dataset
D to the server S is a tuple of five algorithms:
1We do not consider boolean circuit for verification because the numerous
multiplications in machine learning algorithms make them more suitable for
arithmetic circuits.
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• (EKF , V KF ) ← KeyGen(1λ): is a probabilistic
algorithm that takes as input a security parameter
λ and outputs a public evaluation key EKF and a
verification key V KF .
• (r, I)← Compute(D,F ): is a deterministic algorithm
that takes as input machine learning algorithm F and
a dataset D and outputs the learning results r and a
commitment I.
• (pi, I′)← Prove(EKF , F, x): is a deterministic algo-
rithm that takes as input EKF , an algorithm F , and
data x, and outputs the corresponding proof pi and
auxiliary information I′.
• (0, 1) ← Verify(V KF , x, I′, pi): is a deterministic
algorithm that takes as input V KF and outputs 1 if
F (x) = I′ and I′ = I; 0, otherwise.
• (0, 1) ← Payment(c, u): is a deterministic algorithm
that takes as input a rule u and a condition c, and
outputs 1 if c satisfies u; 0, otherwise.
We say that VeriML is a secure protocol if the following
properties are satisfied.
• Completeness. The probability that Payment outputs
1 (Accept) is 1 if Verify outputs 1 (Accept).
• Soundness. The probability that Verify outputs 1 (Ac-
cept) is less than 2−l if S does not follow the protocol,
where l is the bit length of the inputs.
• Fairness. C learns the witness iff he pays the fee, and
S gets paid iff he has the correct result.
The key problem to guarantee fairness between S and C
in this outsourced computation service is to efficiently verify
the result correctness. The definitions of correctness, security
and efficiency of verifiable computations [30] are inherited.
B. Threat Model
We consider a generic setting for a cloud-based ML service,
where a client C uploads a training dataset D to a server S,
who runs the ML algorithm to train a model M . We assume
that S is malicious but rational, i.e., it may deviate from the
protocol only if some additional economic benefits can be
earned. Specifically, S may cut back on the training process to
save computation and storage costs. And we assume that if S
has indeed executed the task correctly, it will not deliver a fake
model after the verification. In Section VII, we will discuss
how to relax this assumption by verifying the performance
of the delivered model. C is considered to be honest-but-
curious, i.e., it may try to learn the trained model M before
the payment. Obviously, verifiability is critical to the system,
i.e., the client is allowed to verify the correctness of the trained
model without knowing any information about it.
The main purpose of our work is to solve the problem
in verifying the integrity of ML model training, i.e., proving
that S has actually executed the specified computation task.
Beyond that, we also aim to ensure the integrity of prediction
services provided by S without revealing the ML model to C.
In the literature, there exist a series of works that study how to
obtain information about the model or the server’s training data
by observing the prediction results, such as model inversion
attack [32], model extraction attack [33] and membership
inference attack [34]. These studies are outside the scope of
this work.
V. OVERVIEW OF VERIML
In this section, we first discuss the main design challenges,
followed by an overview of our VeriML system.
A. Challenges
A naive solution to the problem of verifiable outsourced
ML is to invoke the existing VC protocols. The client C can
construct the circuit that covers the whole learning process, and
generate the corresponding key pairs. The server S evaluates
the circuit and produces the proof. However, such a naive
solution is infeasible in practice since ML algorithms usually
require a large number of sequential loop iterations, and it is
difficult to be represented by the circuit. Moreover, each iter-
ation mainly consists of matrix multiplications and non-linear
functions, which are extremely expensive for verification.
A straightforward modification to the above solution may
be sampling several iterations for verification. A large enough
sample size with uniformly-selected samples may help detect
incorrect iterations with high probability. However, due to the
nature of training, it is difficult to ensure that the proved
iterations are the same as required. For instance, the client may
request the proof for the 10K-th iteration, but the malicious
server might still be able to cheat by executing an iteration
with an arbitrary input. This means that whether the produced
proof is actually corresponding to the 10K-th iteration needs
be further proved.
Another limitation of existing VC methods is that they
require the server to reveal the trained model to the client for
proof verification. This allows the client to obtain the trained
model without payment. On the other hand, if the client does
not own the trained model, the server can arbitrarily forge
proofs to pass the verification. Now we are facing a dilemma:
how can the correctness of the ML algorithm execution be
verified without knowing the trained model? And further, how
can fair payments be guaranteed?
B. VeriML Outline
The core idea of VeriML is to make the training process
retrievable, namely, the verifier can reconstruct the inputs and
outputs for any specific iteration, and the retrieval process is
verifiable. After the verification, a fair exchange of the payment
and the trained model can be done via the blockchain. Figure 1
depicts the architecture of VeriML. In summary, there are three
phases: Computation Phase, Verification Phase and Payment
Phase.
Computation Phase. S executes the machine learning task.
To enable the retrievability of the training process, S needs
to save additional auxiliary information, e.g., the intermediate
states of the training process.
Verification Phase. After S completes the training, C
sends multiple challenges to S for the proofs of specified
iterations. In particular, C generates the key pairs and sends
EKF to S. Instead of verifying all iterations, C randomly
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Fig. 1: Overview and workflow of VeriML
samples a small subset of iterations as challenges, for which
S produces the corresponding proofs. If all proofs can pass the
verification algorithm, C considers that S has executed the ML
task correctly with high probability.
To retrieve a specified iteration, S needs two inputs: the
batch of the training data in the current iteration, and the
model’s state in the previous iteration. The data batch selection
can be agreed upon by the two parties. The model’s state can
be retrieved by re-executing the training process. To reduce
the additional overhead, S saves some intermediate states of
the model, referred to checkpoints. Then any state can be
retrieved from the checkpoints by several iterations without
cryptographic operations. Finally, S extracts a short identifier
in each state during training, and sends it to C for checking
the correctness of the challenges.
Payment Phase. If all proofs pass the verification, C will
pay S for the outsourced ML service. Inspired by ZKCP [6],
we design a compact contract that only uses hash functions
(e.g., SHA256) for the limited blockchain-based scripting
languages. The contract ensures a fair exchange between C
and S. Our protocol can resist some attacks of the original
ZKCP [7], as will be discussed in Section VII.
VI. VERIML DESIGN
In this section, we present our design of VeriML. We first
show how to provide a fair machine learning service for linear
regression, and then extend the protocol to support other ML
algorithms which include support vector machines, K-Means
and decision trees.
A. Linear Regression
We use a d-dimensional vector w to represent the param-
eters of the trained learning model. The value of w at the
current iteration is referred to as a state. In each iteration, the
SGD algorithm inputs a batch of samples X, their labels Y
and the current state w. The state w is updated by penalizing
the deviation between predicted labels and actual labels of the
batch. The update equation is
w = w − α
b
b∑
i=1
(xiw − yi)xi, (1)
where b is the size of the batch and α is the learning rate.
Decimal Arithmetic Operation. Existing implementations
of VC by QAP [10], [19], [18], [35] do not support decimal
numbers in arithmetic operations. To address this problem,
we adopt the fixed point number representation. We restrict
that each input has at most l bits of decimal points. Before
invoking the circuit, we transform all inputs to integers by
multiplying them by 2l. However, the multiplication of two
inputs will yield a product that has a different length. In
linear regression, the right side of Equation (1) will become
w×2l− αb
∑b
i=1(Xw×22l−Y×2l)X×2l by the fixed point
number representation, in which the amplification of each term
is inconsistent, and the operation will fail to produce the right
result. Therefore, we need to apply appropriate scaling factors
in the equation by multiplying it with a certain constant. After
each iteration, the output needs to be truncated to l bits to
serve as the input to the next iteration.
Circuit Construction. To verify the correctness of the
SGD algorithm in each iteration, we need to construct a
circuit for prediction, and then calculate the mean square
error (MSE) of the prediction for the current batch of data.
In linear regression, the prediction only involves addition and
multiplication. MSE is calculated as y = 1b
∑b
i=1(wxi− yi)2,
which can be implemented by addition and multiplication
operations. If the batch size b is more than 1, the division 1b
can be transformed to one multiplication by a constant since
the batch size is set in advance, e.g., if the batch size is 32,
we can multiply the result by 2−5.
Model Blinding. In existing VC schemes, C must know
the input and output of each iteration, i.e., the intermediate
state of the model, to perform verification. However, the state
cannot be revealed to C since he may leverage it as a trained
model and abort without payment. Therefore, we have to
enable C to verify the correctness of each iteration without
knowing the input and output states of the iteration. The input
state can be preserved by the zero-knowledge property of
SNARK, and we design a blinding scheme to mask the output
state as an identifier. The blinding scheme should satisfy two
requirements: 1) It is hard to retrieve the output state from
the identifier and 2) The collision probability of two different
output states is small. The second requirement prevents S
from producing a correct identifier with an incorrect input.
Specifically, because the output state w′ is only determined
by the input state w and the batch X, we need to ensure that
it is hard for S to generate a fake state which can pass the
verification with a given batch.
Intuitively, the hash function is a good choice for blinding
the states. Nonetheless, implementing hash functions such
5
VeriML Protocol for the Training Service
• Setup:
1) The client C sends the parameters of learning algorithm to S, which includes the learning rate α, the batch
size b and the threshold of convergence t. After agreement, C compiles the verification circuit F to the QAP
program locally.
2) With the security number λ, C generates the key pairs (EKF , V KF )← KeyGen(F, 1λ) and a random seed
s to be used for choosing batch samples. Then C sends the seed s to S.
• Computation Phase:
1) For each iteration i, S selects the batch samples by seed s.
2) Taking state wi−1 of the previous iteration and the data batch as input, S outputs an updated state wi and
saves its identifier Ii.
3) After every N/k iterations, S saves the state as a checkpoint.
4) If the difference of accuracy between epoch em and em−1 is less than the threshold t, S terminates the training
process and sends identifiers I1, . . . , Im to C.
• Verification Phase:
1) C sends the circuit and EKF to S.
2) S checks the correctness of the circuit.
3) C randomly chooses m iterations s1, . . . , sm for verification, and sends the set of indexes to S to challenge
the corresponding proofs pis1 , . . . , pism .
4) S locates the checkpoints and retrieves states ws1−1, . . . ,wsm−1. Then S produces proof (I
′
si−1 , I
′
si , pisi)←
Prove(EKF , F,wsi−1 ,Xsi) for each i, and sends the results (I
′
si−1 , I
′
si , pisi) to C.
5) C selects the inputs of samples also by the random seed s, then runs vsi ← Verify(V KF ,Xsi , I′si−1 , I′si , pisi)
for all selected iterations. If there exists vsi = 0, C outputs Reject; otherwise, C compares {I′si−1 , I′si} with{Isi−1 , Isi} in the commitment. If ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ m, the commitments and the verification results are the same,
C outputs Accept, otherwise Reject.
• Payment Phase: If C outputs Accept after the verification phase, then the two parties enter the payment phase.
1) S encrypts the trained model w by a symmetric key k, then sends Enck(w) and h = SHA256(k) to C.
2) C posts a transaction T on the blockchain to pay the pre-determined fee f to the party who presents x such
that SHA256(x) = h.
3) S presents string z to T . If SHA256(z) = h, then T sends the fee to S, otherwise returns the payment to C.
Fig. 2: The VeriML protocol for the training service
as SHA256 in arithmetic circuit requires a lot of shifting
and bitwise operations, which are much more expensive than
arithmetic operations, and it significantly raises the computa-
tion cost of Prove. Moreover, the computation cost of hashes
increases linearly with the dimension of the input state. To deal
with this issue, we design a simple yet effective solution. We
sum all elements in the output/input state vector w, then only
hash the summation2. The field of SNARK is 254-bit long,
shorter than the size of half a block in SHA256 (512 bits),
thus the circuit only needs to execute one block in SHA256
to avoid the large cost in hashing a large state.
However, the straightforward summation has one shortcom-
ing: the correctness of the summation result does not always
ensure the correctness of the individual model parameters. To
address this problem, we introduce an enhanced approach by
using a random coefficient vector v generated by C to calculate
the (random) weighted summation. And we would hash the
inner product w · v as the identifier. We will analyze the
security of this design in Section. VII.
Hyper-parameter Encoding. The learning rate α has a
significant impact on the training performance. Tuning α will
affect the convergence speed of training, thereby affect the
2To avoid the additional leakage by the hash value, we concatenate the
summation with another 254-bit random number r which is generated by a
common random seed before hashing.
number of iterations and the model’s performance. In this
paper, we mainly consider a fixed learning rate such that we
can encode α into the circuit as a constant to reduce the
computation cost. If α changes from iteration to iteration, to
avoid recompiling the circuit and generating the key, we can
treat α as an input to the circuit, which adds d multiplications
for one iteration. The batch size b is another important hyper-
parameter that can be encoded into the circuit. Large batch
size will increase the computation cost in each iteration. If
the batch size increases by 1, 2d additional multiplications are
required for each iteration, which greatly augments the proving
time.
Iteration Verification. After constructing a circuit to verify
the execution of each iteration, C can check all iterations to
validate the integrity of the whole training process. However,
the number of iterations may be huge, which leads to a
prohibitively long time for proving correctness. To tackle this
issue, we design a novel protocol which randomly samples a
small subset of iterations to detect the misbehaviors during
training.
Let N denote the total number of iterations that are claimed
to be completed by S. In the training process, after finishing
the i-th iteration (1 ≤ i ≤ N ), S saves the identifier Ii (a
hash value of the summation of the elements in the output
state wi). Upon completing the training process, S sends all
identifiers I1, . . . , IN to C as a commitment for verification.
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S may adulterate identifiers to falsify his workload.
When C has received the commitment, he randomly sam-
ples a small subset {s1, . . . , sm} of m iterations (1 ≤ m ≤ N )
as challenges. To produce the proof of the si-th iteration,
S needs two inputs: the output state wsi−1 of the previous
iteration and the batch Xsi of this iteration. Then S runs
Prove(EKF , XsI ,wsi−1) to produce the proof and sends it
to C. Finally, C checks if the produced proof pii can pass
Verify(V KF , Isi−1 , Isi , pisi) and determines if Isi is the same
as the corresponding identifier in the commitment.
Apart from verifying the consistency of the output of Verify
with the commitment, we also have to verify the authenticity
of the input state because S may output meaningless results
but still can pass the verification. For example, S can use
an all-zero vector 0 as a fake state. The output of forward
propagation is always 0, which allows S to generate correct
identifiers while cheating on the computation (only conduct the
backward propagation calculation). However, the identifiers in
the commitment are generated by the output of each iteration,
which is different from the input to the next iteration, since
we truncate the output to l bits before feeding it as input to
the next iteration. Therefore, we cannot verify the authenticity
of the input state directly from the commitment. To solve this
problem, we propose to let S prove that it has the preimage of
identifier Ii−1 in the commitment, and the difference between
the preimage and the summation of the input state is less than
d
2l
∑
j=1 dvij , where d is the dimension of the data.
Saving all intermediate states inevitably induces a high
storage cost for S. Therefore, we propose to set checkpoints
to retrieve the states. Specifically, we partition the N iterations
into k groups, and thus each group contains N/k states. S only
saves the output state of the first iteration in each group as a
checkpoint such that the i-th state in a group can be retrieved
by re-conducting i iterations from the checkpoint. Note that
S can tune the parameter k to make a tradeoff between the
storage and retrieving costs. This retrieving process does not
involve any cryptographic operations, i.e., generating keys
or producing proofs, thus the additional computation cost is
acceptable.
Obviously, the core of our scheme is to reproduce the
identifiers by VC. To achieve this, in the training and veri-
fication phases, the chosen data batches need to be consistent.
In general, the inputs are chosen by randomly shuffling the
whole dataset, so we can let C assign a random seed and send
it to S. For each epoch, as long as the two parties use the same
seed and algorithm to shuffle the dataset, they can reproduce
and verify the identifiers later. Note that C has to check the
distinctness of the selected batches. Otherwise, S will have
advantages to forge identifiers.
Payment. The payment process has to ensure a fair ex-
change, i.e., to prevent either S or C from cheating one
another. More specifically, a malicious C would like to obtain
the trained model without paying anything while a malicious
S expects to get the payment without executing the whole
training process. Inspired by ZKCP, we design an effective
payment protocol that can achieve a fair exchange. First, S
encrypts the final state of the trained model using a symmetric
key k, then sends Enck(w) and h = SHA256(k) to C. Then,
C posts a transaction on the blockchain to transfer the payment
VeriML Protocol for Prediction Service
1) C generates the key pair (EKF , V KF ) ←
KeyGen(F, 1λ), then C sends EKF and data X to
S.
2) S runs the prediction algorithm to compute
the result. Then S produces the proof pi ←
Prove(EKF , F, w,X) which takes the result as a
witness, and compares if the witness is equivalent
to the output of the circuit, then sends the produced
proof pi to C.
3) C runs v ← Verify(V KF ,X, pi) and outputs Reject
if the output is 0. Otherwise, C sends the request
for the result.
4) S encrypts the result m as c by a symmetric key
k: c = Enck(m), and sends c and the hash value
h = SHA256(k) to C.
5) C posts a transaction T on the blockchain to pay
the fee f to the party who presents x such that
SHA256(x) = h.
6) S presents the string z to T . If SHA256(z) = h, T
sends the fee to S, otherwise gives the refund to C.
Fig. 3: VeriML protocol for the prediction service
to anyone who reveals a preimage of h. In this way, C cannot
decrypt the trained model without payment via the transaction
on the blockchain, and S cannot obtain the payment without
passing the verification or providing the key to C. We hereto
realize the fair exchange.
Prediction Service. We also consider the case that S
provides the prediction service to C instead of training a
model. To verify the prediction results, we can construct a
similar circuit, but do not have to yield multiple identifiers to
help check the correctness of each iteration. Here, S should
not directly reveal the prediction result to C for verification
since C may get away with the result without paying any-
thing. Hence, we transform the verification process to a zero-
knowledge proof that sets the prediction results as a witness,
and compares whether the witness equals the result of forward
propagation calculated by the circuit. If it does, C can confirm
that S actually generates the correct prediction results.
We present the protocol for the training service by summa-
rizing the above constructions in Figure 2. An adapted protocol
for the prediction service is given in Figure 3.
B. Logistic Regression
Compared with linear regression, logistic regression faces
the main challenge of computing the sigmoid activation func-
tion f(x) = 11+e−x , since the division and exponentiation
are not supported by an arithmetic circuit. Prior works have
presented various approaches to approximate the sigmoid func-
tion. In this section, we will discuss the differences of these
approaches in terms of efficiency and accuracy, and propose a
more feasible solution for the QAP application.
Piecewise and polynomial approximation are two main-
stream approaches to implement sigmoid functions in prior
works [5], [36], [37]. The piecewise method, which relies on
comparisons, is much more expensive than arithmetic opera-
tions in QAP, since one comparison between two l-bit integers
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requires a split operation that consumes l + 2 constraints
while one multiplication between two integers only consumes
one constraint. Therefore, the polynomial approximation is
obviously more favorable.
Taylor expansion is a classical method to approximate
nonlinear functions, and its accuracy highly depends on the
degree of the polynomial terms. The higher the degree of the
polynomial term, the better the approximation performance.
But the computation cost will be higher, and it is easy to
exceed the finite field. Inspired by [37], we use the Remez
algorithm to implement the approximation with high efficiency
and accuracy. However, the Remez method is still only suitable
for a certain range of the input because of the unbounded tails,
and the input beyond the proper range may affect the accuracy
of the approximation, hence we need to set an appropriate
range to calculate the approximated polynomial.
Setting the degree of polynomials as three, and the ap-
proximated range of x as [-5, 5], the approximation of Remez
is f(x) = −0.004x3 + 0.197x + 0.5 and that of the Taylor
expansion is f(x) = − 148x3+0.25x+0.5. It can be seen that
the Remez-based approximation is closer to the original sig-
moid function in a wider range. More results about the training
accuracy of the approximations are presented in Section VIII.
C. Neural Networks
To efficiently apply VeriML to neural networks, we design
an inversed verification method to reduce the size of the circuit
by utilizing pre-computed results.
Traditional matrix multiplications using circuit has a com-
plexity of O(n3), which is very time-consuming. Observations
in prior works show that verifying the correctness of results is
much cheaper than computing the results forwardly [9], [19],
[20]. For example, verifying c = a/b is hard to be implemented
in QAP but instead we can verify a = b × c efficiently.
Following this rationale, we use Freivald’s algorithm [38] to
inverse the forward computation when constructing the circuit.
Freivald’s algorithm is a probabilistic randomized algorithm
for verifying matrix multiplications. Assume that we have three
n×n matrices A, B and C. By using a uniformly-sampled n×1
random vector r over field Zns , the correctness of AB = C can
be reviewed by verifying whether A(Br) = Cr stands. The
false positive rate is 1/(s+ 1). By selecting a large field, we
can reduce the probability of a false positive to a negligible
value. Because the random r is selected after S has generated
the commitment, it can be selected in advance and encoded in
the circuit as constants to save the computation cost.
With the help of Freivald’s algorithm, the verification
requires only O(n2) multiplications. For neural networks, let
ni denote the number of neurons in the i-th layer. The number
of matrix multiplications in one layer descends from bnini−1
to bni−1 (with bni−1 + nini−1 multiplications by constants).
For a neural network with β matrix multiplications, as these
multiplications are independent, the false positive rate for one
iteration is less than 1/(s+ 1)β , which is negligible.
In a typical SNARK implementation, the arithmetic circuit
operates over a 254-bit field. The continuous multiplications of
multiple layers make the length of the results rapidly increase,
which may lead to an overflow. The proposed verification
inversion method can mitigate the overflow due to fewer mul-
tiplications. Furthermore, we can truncate the multiplication
results before feeding them to the circuit. To avoid the problem
of inconsistent bit lengths of different results, we conduct an
additional check to see if the difference between the two results
is less than 2−l. In addition, some other tricks which utilize
randomness in training neural networks, such as dropout, are
easy to be implemented by using a consistent random seed.
Softmax Function Verification. The softmax function
f(xi) =
e−xi∑κ
i=1 e
−xi is used for multi-class classification, where
κ is the number of classes. To verify the function, we have
to tackle the difficulties of computing exponentiation and
division in the circuit. The output of softmax is a probability
distribution so that all results are non-negative. Therefore, we
can adopt square function to replace exponentiation operations.
Unlike other activation functions that can be approximated
into division-free forms, the division operation in the softmax
function is inevitable. Since that division is not supported by
SNARK (division by constant can be transformed to multi-
plication), we adopt the strategy of inverting verification that
checking the equality of the dividend and the product of the
divisor and the result. For each data sample, S calculates the
results of softmax and feeds them as witness to the circuit. For
a batch of data, the input to the circuit is a b× κ matrix, and
the circuit needs to perform bm additional multiplications.
D. Support Vector Machine
Besides the SGD-based methods, support vector machine
(SVM) is another classic and popular machine learning algo-
rithm, for solving classification problems. The training process
of SVM can also be represented as sequential loop iterations,
so we can transfer it into the VeriML framework naturally. In
this paper, we consider the most representative case of binary
classification proposed in [39]. The details of SVM are omitted
due to the space limitation.
The main construction of training a SVM model is the
same as the prior methods, i.e., using a small batch of data
to update the model after each iteration until the objective
function converges. Specifically, apart from the basic additions
and multiplications, each iteration includes two divisions, one
Euclidean projection and b + 1 comparisons. As discussed
before, verifying divisions and square roots can be transformed
to the multiplication operations using the pre-computed results.
Therefore, we can construct the arithmetic circuit straightfor-
wardly.
E. K-Means
VeriML can be scaled with clustering, a type of task
which expects to partition multiple data samples into several
clusters, because the process of training a clustering model
also consists of sequential loop iterations. Here we use the
most typical clustering algorithm–K-Means to demonstrate the
protocol design.
In the beginning, C randomly chooses k centroids to
represent the clusters. In each iteration, the K-Means algorithm
assigns each training sample to the cluster closest to it, then
uses the average of all the samples in this cluster to update
the centroid. Here we choose to use a small batch of data in
each iteration to reduce the circuit size. According to the prior
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results [40], this operation will not have a significant impact on
the accuracy. Because the centroids are represented by vectors,
the commitment can be generated by the random coefficient
vector as well.
Verifying the Closest Distance. The main cost of exe-
cuting the circuit lies in finding the closest distance of the
k centroids. When the batch size is b, each iteration needs
to execute bk comparisons, which involve large computation
overhead. Here we avoid the comparisons by checking the
correctness of the candidate closest distance given by the
server. Specifically, for each data sample, the circuit takes the
candidate closest distance as an input. Then the circuit executes
the subtractions between the candidate closest distance and all
the k previously-obtained distances, respectively. If the circuit
finally outputs only one 0, and all the other results are negative,
the candidate closest distance is considered as a correct one.
F. Decision Tree
Decision tree and its variants are significantly different
from other machine learning methods discussed above. This is
because training or using a tree is composed of comparisons,
rather than additions and multiplications. Intuitively, verifying
the correctness of the structure of a trained tree, is equivalent
to checking two conditions: 1) for each internal node, whether
the partition is done based on the largest information gain, and
2) whether the data samples belonging to this node are actually
composed by its children nodes. The sampling strategy can still
be adopted to verify the integrity of the whole tree, and the
comparisons can be verified efficiently by the technique we
proposed in verifying K-Means. Because the number of data
samples directly affects the correctness of finding partitions,
the batch strategy is no longer applicable. Now we are facing
two challenges: (1) how to reduce the circuit’s I/O caused by
traversing all the training data, and (2) how to avoid revealing
the tree to C in the verification phase.
Compressing the Inputs. Instead of using batches to split
the data horizontally, we use histograms to reduce the input
size vertically. LightGBM [41] proposed representing inputs
with histograms to accelerate the training of decision trees.
Inspired by this idea, in our design, C buckets feature values
into multiple bins before the training process. Concretely, for
each feature, C first converts its field to bins, then traverses
all the data to construct the histogram and sends it to S. S can
only use the histogram to calculate information gains and find
partitions. Assume that there are n data samples. Each sample
has d features, each of which is bucketed into k discrete bins.
Using histogram thus can reduce the number of inputs from
nd to kd. In the meanwhile, verifying if a node is correctly
partitioned can be transformed to verifying if its histogram is
equivalent to the addition of its child nodes’ histograms.
Commitments for Decision Tree. Compared with other
ML algorithms, training decision tree does not include the
iterative optimization process. This makes the previous method
which blinds the states of the model no longer applicable.
Instead, we observe that the histogram is updated after each
partition, and the updates cannot change the structure other
than the values of bins, so we can blind the histogram with
the same commitment method described before, and check
if the histograms of sampled nodes are the same with the
commitment. Such a commitment may reveal the structure of
the tree to C, and this can be fixed by adding dummy nodes
to fill the tree to be “perfect”, i.e., all the leaves have the same
depth and all the internal nodes have the same degree.
Computing predictions by decision tree can only be im-
plemented by multiple comparisons. Note that for categorical
features, comparing the features with partitions can be trans-
formed to checking the equalities, which has lower computa-
tion costs.
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Theorem 2. Assuming there exists no more efficient algorithm
that can output the correct result than the training algorithm,
the proposed protocol VeriML is secure if the properties of
completeness, soundness, and fairness are satisfied simultane-
ously.
Proof: This assumption is reasonable, since otherwise the
original training algorithm would be meaningless.
Completeness. The completeness of the setup, computation
and verification phases depends on the completeness of the
underlying verifiable computation scheme. The completeness
of the payment phase depends on the correctness of SHA256
and the consensus mechanism of blockchain.
If both S and C faithfully follow the protocol, S can pass
the Verify algorithm and earn the service fee by presenting the
preimage of the key to C for decrypting the trained model,
and C can obtain the trained model or prediction service by
posting the payment transaction.
Soundness. A forged training workload will be accepted by
C iff all the sampled iterations can pass the verification algo-
rithm. Because the outputs of VC can always be considered
as the ground truth with the given inputs, a cheating server
S aims to provide a pair of models wi−1 and wi such that
the outputs of VC are the same with the commitment. If the
probability for achieving this is less than 2−l, the soundness
property can be proved. We show that if S can pass Verify
without the correct execution, there are only two ways for S
to cheat.
CASE 1. The cheating S directly forges the identifiers
Ii−1 and Ii without using the models when generating the
commitment. S knows the randomly generated coefficient
vector v before making the commitment. We consider that
S can always find one of w∗i−1 and w
∗
i which corresponds
to the committed identifier, and he only needs to find the
other one. When the i-th iteration is sampled, since the forged
identifiers are not computed from a model, the distribution of
the identifiers is uniform (from the perspective of S). If the
bit lengths of both the output parameters w and the random
coefficients v are l, their dot product extends the preimage of
the hash to 2l bits, and the probability that the forged identifier
is the same as the ground truth is 2−2l.
CASE 2. We assume that the cheating S can find a
way to compute w∗i−1 or w
∗
i without executing the training
algorithm when generating the commitment. We do not make
any assumption about its approach, e.g., he may utilize some
background knowledge about the model such as the distribu-
tion of the parameters. Yet, according to the basic assumption
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that there exists no way to obtain the result without the correct
computation, the forged model and the ground truth should be
different. We also consider the scenario where S can find one
of w∗i−1 and w
∗
i corresponding to the committed identifier.
Without loss of generality, the unknown model is denoted by
w∗. To ensure that w∗ and the ground truth w have the same
identifier, we need to guarantee
v1(w1−w∗1)+v2(w2−w∗2)+ · · ·+vd(wd−w∗d) = 0. (2)
Since w∗ does not equal to w, there exists i such that
vi =
x(wi −w∗i )− vi(wi −w∗i )
w∗i −wi
. (3)
Because the coefficient vector v is uniformly random, the
value of the right hand side in Equation (3) is uniformly
random. If the bit length of w is l, the probability that vi
satisfies Equation (3) is 2−l.
There may exist some special cases which will discard
some steps in an iteration. For example, in the SGD algorithm,
if S can find a model w∗ whose outputs are exactly the same
as the labels of the data batch, i.e., w∗ × x = y, w∗ will
not be updated in this iteration. In other words, S can directly
output w∗ without any computations. Such an attack is easy
to be detected by VC, because S knows the existence of
the detection. Thus the soundness property of our system is
satisfied.
If the claimed total number of iterations is N , the propor-
tion of genuine identifiers is t (i.e., the proportion is 1− t for
corrupted ones), and C randomly samples c different iterations,
the probability that all the sampled iterations are genuine is
p =
(
tN
c
)(
N
c
) = (tN + 1− c)(tN + 2− c) · · · (tN)
(N + 1− c)(N + 2− c) · · ·N , (4)
which means that the upper bound of this probability is p.
When a fake identifier passes the verification, this upper
bound will be relaxed. Given the definition of soundness, if
all the data and parameters have l bits, the probability that a
fake identifier is exactly the same as the genuine one is less
than 2−l. Hence, the upper bound is relaxed to
 =
c∑
i=0
(
tN
c−i
)(
N
c
) 1
2li
< p+ (1− p)
c∑
i=1
1
2li
< p+
1− p
2l − 1 . (5)
For instance, if S claims 100K iterations and performs only
70K iterations (t = 70%), C only needs to verify 10 or 14
iterations to detect the misbehavior with a probability higher
than 95% or 99%, respectively.
Fairness. A malicious S has incentives to forge proofs
or identifiers in the commitments. Since the program and
the evaluation keys are provided by C, it is easy to detect
fake proofs. The probability that a fake commitment passes
the verification is extremely small after sampling multiple
iterations. Therefore, S is prevented from forging the training
process, since once detected, it will not get paid. Also, S will
faithfully present the preimage of the key k to receive the
payment. As a result, the protocol ensures that S will deliver
the trained model and claim the real training workload.
A malicious C is motivated to learn about the trained model
without payment, and C can only obtain the output of VC (i.e.,
the confidentiality of the witness depends on the underlying
VC protocol). It is also difficult for C to manipulate EKF to
infer the exact value of the witness. Other malicious behaviors,
such as claiming that a correct proof is incorrect or posting an
invalid transaction on the blockchain, cannot help C to learn
the model.
Comparisons. Several other attacks have been proposed to
break the original ZKCP protocol [7]. First, if the purchase is a
service (not goods), e.g., an audit of online file storage, C can
infer from the proof that the service is correct, and then abort
the protocol without payment. However, for the outsourced
ML service, the client aims to obtain the trained model or
prediction results rather than a simple answer of yes or no. The
proof only allows C to certify the correctness of the service
but will not reveal any additional information. Hence, there
is no incentive for C to abort the protocol after verifying the
proofs.
Second, C may modify the common reference string
(CRS), i.e., the EKF and V KF , to learn information from
proofs [7]. A malicious C can check whether a value in the
witness is the exact one or not. For instance, in the pay-to-
sudoku service, the client can find out the exact value for a
Sudoku cell with a probability of 1/9. However, for machine
learning services, it is difficult to find the values in witness as
they are represented by more bits. Specifically, if a parameter
in the witness has l bits, the probability of finding its exact
value is 1/2l, which is negligible. Therefore, C is allowed to
choose the CRS in our scheme.
Finally, C needs to ensure that the results delivered by
S are actually encrypted by the key. This may require sym-
metric encryption schemes such as AES [42], and the circuit
implementation of which will lead to a high cost (4.2 × 106
constraints only for 300 blocks [20]). For instance, the simple
three-layer fully-connected neural network with 128 hidden
neurons consumes 25,408 blocks (if each parameter has 32
bits), which is too expensive. Recently, FairSwap [8] proposed
to utilize the Merkle tree to verify the hash value of a large
file without using the zero-knowledge proof. Combining this
technique with VeriML may help achieve stronger security
guarantee.
In summary, the attacks which can break the ZKCP pro-
tocol will not affect our scheme, because it is difficult to
guess the continuous values in machine learning, and what
we focus on is the verification of the computation workload
of the training process, rather than verifying the existence of
just a service or a file. Moreover, because the underlying VC
protocol is independent with our system, these attacks can be
better defended by other building blocks which do not need
the trusted setup, such as [17], [18].
Discussions about the DoS attack. Apart from the fairness
concern to ensure a fair exchange of service and payment
between the client and the server, another issue is that parties
may prematurely abort from the protocol. For instance, a
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Algorithm Dataset Dimension Batch KeyGen (s) Prove (s) Verify (ms) Native (ms) EK (MB) VK (MB)
Linear Regression BHP 13
32 2.0 0.46 5.9 32 11.7 18.6
64 2.0 0.47 6.4 34 11.8 36.1
128 2.1 0.51 7.5 36 12.1 70.9
Logistic Regression US 15
32 2.1 0.42 6.1 33 11.9 21.1
64 2.2 0.45 6.2 34 12.1 41.0
128 2.2 0.47 7.6 37 12.5 80.1
NN MNIST 784
32 25.4 12.0 989 475 159.1 19.5
64 27.0 13.4 1068 825 166.7 21.2
128 33.4 16.7 1231 1523 185.9 24.4
SVM US 15
32 2.1 0.43 6.1 94 11.6 24.2
64 6.4 0.45 6.5 103 11.7 45.4
128 2.2 0.47 7.5 115 11.8 87.8
K-Means MNIST 784
32 8.7 2.9 42.3 334 52.4 1.6
64 15.3 5.4 64.5 601 99.4 2.5
128 27.3 9.6 106 1253 189.5 4.5
Decision Tree Nursery 27 − 6.2 1.8 5.5 136 11.9 0.01
TABLE I: Verification costs of all implemented algorithms
malicious server may be interested in obtaining the data from
the client but abort before or during the computation phase,
while a malicious client may launch a DoS attack by aborting
the protocol before the payment phase or lying about the
verification to consume the computing resources of the server.
One possible solution is to ask the client and the server to
make certain deposits in advance. If the protocol is followed
through, each party will be refunded their deposits; if one
party prematurely aborts the protocol, this party will lose the
deposit. Intuitively, the deposit of the malicious party should be
used to compensate for the other party. However, it is difficult
for the smart contract to detect certain malicious behaviors,
e.g., if the client outputs Reject in the verification phase, it
is hard to tell whether the server fails in the verification or
the client lies about the verification. This is partly because the
cost of implementing complex operations on a smart contract
is very expensive. In [8], the authors proposed to mitigate the
risk from a malicious client by making the server do some
pre-computation activities. But in MLaaS, the server cannot
perform any pre-computation before having received the data
from the client. Therefore, the traditional deposit and refund
strategy cannot well solve the malicious abort problem in
MLaaS, and this can be an interesting open problem.
The correctness of the delivery. In this paper, we are
mainly concerned about the correctness of the delivery, i.e.., S
will not deliver a fake model if the integrity of the training
has been verified, since this behavior brings no economic
incentives, and may affect the server’s reputation potentially.
To provide stronger security guarantee, here we discuss how
to verify the correctness of the delivered model.
The goal of verifying the model correctness is to ensure
that the delivery has the claimed prediction accuracy, S will
first construct a circuit, taking the delivery as input, to make
predictions on a small test set. Then, S extends this circuit
to commit the hash of the model rather than its identifier,
and produces the corresponding proof. Using Merkle hash
tree and the FairSwap protocol can help save the computation
overhead of this step. If this proof can pass the verification
algorithm, the correctness of the delivered model is verified.
For the prediction service, this step is more effective since the
prediction results may have smaller size and can be hashed by
the circuit directly.
Another potential malicious behavior is that after attaining
the pre-defined termination condition S may keep training to
charge more. The use of VC to verify the performances of
multiple epochs might too expensive. We concern that over-
training also requires S to execute the computation which
causes low benefits, so appropriate billing policies which can
motivate S to finish a task as soon as possible can mitigate
such this behavior. For example, if the training task is finished
at a given time, S will earn an additional bonus and a better
reputation.
VIII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present the implementation and experi-
mental results to show the performance of VeriML.
A. Implementations
Setup. Our system is implemented in Java. We use the
jsnark compiler [43] to produce the circuit and adopt lib-
snark [35] as the backend. The server side which executes
the proving part runs on a desktop with Ubuntu 16.04, Intel
Xeon W-2133 CPU and 64GB RAM. The client side runs on a
laptop with Ubuntu 16.04, Intel Core i5-4460S CPU and 16GB
RAM to execute the generation and verification.
Datasets. The datasets we use are as follows. The Boston
House Price dataset (BHP) [44] contains 506 samples, 13
features, and the label is the house price. The banknote authen-
tication (BA) dataset is extracted from images of genuine and
forged banknote-like specimens with 4 features and a binary
label [45]. The Nursery dataset [46] has 12,960 samples and
8 features (we bucket the features to 27 bins), and the label
is the outcome of Slovenian nursery admission process. The
dataset US [47] contains 600K census records with 15 features
from the United States. MNIST has 60K images of handwritten
digits, each with 784 features [48].
In VeriML, we implemented six popular machine learn-
ing algorithms: linear regression, logistic regression, neural
network, support vector machine, K-Means and decision tree.
Concretely, we implemented decision tree based on the CART
algorithm [49], and we implemented a 4-layer fully-connected
neural network which is the same as [5], [25] with two
hidden layers (each hidden layer has 128 neurons) and the
approximated sigmoid activation function, and the loss func-
tion is the cross entropy function. All the other algorithms are
implemented based on the standard versions.
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From the point of efficiency view, we calculated the run-
ning time and communication overhead by tuning the batch
size, the main parameter which can affect the performance.
As a comparison, we evaluate the time of the native exe-
cution by running the constructed circuit directly in jsnark,
i.e., the time of only executing the essential computations.
We do not choose to compare with existing ML packages,
because the computation processes without fixed-point number
representations are incompatible with VC techniques, and the
plenty of optimization methods in these packages have not
been implemented by circuits yet. Furthermore, we evaluate
the effect of our sampling and checkpoint strategy. From the
accuracy point of view, we evaluated the effect of fixed-point
approximation, and compared all the proposed approximated
activation functions with benchmarks and existing methods on
4 real-world datasets.
B. Computation Overhead
Because our design is based on sampling which randomly
chooses multiple iterations for verification, we first present the
impact of the sampling strategy, and then discuss the usability
of our system in practice. We assume that both the server and
the client store the dataset and compile the circuits in advance.
Since the proportion of forged iterations is unknown to the
client, the number of sampled iterations is determined by the
client’s expected confidence. Figure 4 presents the needed sam-
ples for different proportions of the correct-executed iterations.
The x-axis is the expected correct proportion of all iterations,
and the y-axis is the number of challenges. When the pro-
portion of forged iterations is large, verifying a few iterations
will enable the client to detect whether the commitment is
forged. With the increasing proportion of genuine iterations,
the required number of challenges will rapidly increase and
cause high latency.
In practice, the server has incentives to forge a lot more
iterations to gain large enough profits, which helps to introduce
an important observation: the number of challenges is affected
by the proportion of genuine iterations, but, insensitive to the
total number of claimed iterations (because in Equation (4),
N is much larger than c), thus around 10 to 15 challenges are
appropriate.
Table I shows the costs of each verification in all the
implemented algorithms. Obviously, to make the ML service
available in practice, the system needs to ensure that the
verification overhead on the client side is less than executing
the training locally. If the claimed number of iterations is N ,
the interval length is m, the number of challenges is c, the
running time of KeyGen is tk, and the proving time, verifying
and executing one iteration are tp, tv and te respectively.
Because the overhead of executing KeyGen is one-off for each
task, we have tk + ctv < Nte. According to Table I, VeriML
is practicable when the task has hundreds of iterations.
The costs of SNARK grows linearly with the circuit size,
i.e., the number of inputs and multiplications of the circuit.
Therefore, batch size is a major factor affecting the overhead.
Table I shows that the overhead grows linearly with the batch
size. Note that training decision tree does not require to set
the batch size, so we omit the discussion here.
On the server side, to make the system as economical as
possible, we also expect to prove that the overhead is less
than executing the training locally. So we have m2 cte + ctp <
Nte, i.e., the total time of generating proofs and retrieving the
model’s states is less than that of training. For the implemented
algorithms, VeriML is economic when the task has thousands
of iterations.
The latency is approximately equivalent to the total time of
retrieving states, producing and verifying proofs, which can be
written as m2 cte+c(tp+tv). Using the linear regression task as
an example, we can see from Table I that the time of retrieving
one state is estimated to be 0.9s while setting the interval
length is 50, and the whole checkpointing scheme requires
about 11.7s with 13 challenges. The time costs of proving and
verification are 6.5s and 0.1s respectively. Furthermore, the
server has additional storage costs in retrieving the model’s
state from checkpoints. If the bit length of parameters is l, and
the model’s dimension is d, the storage cost can be calculated
as ldN/m bits. If the total number of iterations is 10K, the
storage cost is 10.2KB. Figure 5 shows the effects of interval
length on the storage overhead and retrieving time. We can see
that a bit length of 50 is an appropriate balance of computation
and storage costs.
Figure 6 shows the runtime of verifying the whole training
process using linear regression as a concrete example. Here
we assume that the claimed number of iterations is 100K, the
dimension is 13, the batch size is 128, the interval length is
50, and the proportion of genuine iterations is 70%. The server
can prove the claimed workload by spending about 2.2% of
the native execution time, and the cost of verification by the
client is far less than the re-execution of the training task.
Naturally, if the learning task only takes a few iterations,
the cost and latency of verification may not be economic for the
server and the client. But if the convergence speed is slow, i.e.,
the number of iterations is large, the verification is worthwhile.
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Algorithm Dataset Dimension KeyGen (s) Prove (s) Verify (ms) Native (ms) EK (MB) VK (MB)
Linear Regression BHP 13 0.17 0.08 6.2 15 0.2 0.02
Logistic Regression US 15 0.2 0.1 6.2 21 0.2 0.02
NN MNIST 784 22.9 11.7 186.7 408 39.8 2.3
SVM US 15 0.2 0.1 7.7 21 0.2 0.02
K-Means MNIST 784 38.6 23.8 123.3 356 93.9 1.6
Decision Tree Nursery 8 0.2 0.04 5.0 6 0.26 0.01
TABLE II: Verification costs of computing predictions for implemented algorithms
Dataset Sigmoid Taylor Remez Piecewise
BN 73.41 72.60 73.24 73.29
US 87.81 85.11 86.17 85.84
MNIST 95.49 87.82 95.58 96.15
TABLE III: Accuracy of approximated sigmoid
Table II shows the performance of verifying making pre-
dictions over batch size as 64 for all the algorithms. Compared
with Table I, computing predictions is much cheaper than one
iteration in training. This is due to: (1) the part of hashing
is removed from the circuit, (2) it does not need to add the
additional random coefficient vector, and (3) some steps are
no longer needed in making predictions, such as the backward
propagation part.
C. Communication Overhead
The communication overhead lies in transmitting the proofs
and the evaluation keys.
For the first part, because the sizes of each proof and each
identifier are constant (288 bytes and 256 bits respectively),
the communication overhead is only related to the number
of iterations and samples, and will be affected by the kind
of the algorithm. For example, with 10K iterations and 15
proofs, it only costs about 317KB. The communication cost
of the prediction service is constant because only one proof
is required, i.e., 288 bytes without the delivery of prediction
results.
For the second part, the size of EKF is linear with the
number of inputs and multiplications of the circuit. Table I
shows the sizes of the keys for different algorithms. The size
of EKF may be much larger than those of commitments and
proofs. Fortunately, it can be reused for all samples in each
task and transmitted in parallel during the training. Therefore,
it will not affect the performance of verification.
Furthermore, the cost of executing a smart contract to
exchange the key is also cheap. In Ethreum, evaluating one
hash function spends 27,265 gas, which can be translated to
only 0.000214 Ether or 0.047 USD for an exchange rate of
220 USD/Ether.
D. Accuracy Loss
The accuracy loss in our system can be analyzed from two
aspects: the fixed-point representation of rational numbers, and
approximate functions.
In Figure 7, we use linear regression as an example to
show the impact of the fixed-point representation. The learning
rate is set as 0.05 and the number of iterations is 10K. While
varying the bit length between 4 and 48, the mean error of
the trained model decreases rapidly. We can observe that a
32-bit representation has no obvious accuracy loss. In our
implementations, linear regression, SVM and K-Means do not
include the approximate functions, so their accuracy losses can
be ignored. Furthermore, the prior work [41] shows that using
histogram will not affect the accuracies of decision trees.
For implementing logistic regression and neural network,
we introduce the approximated sigmoid function as the acti-
vation function. Table III shows that the Remez method has
better performance than the Taylor extension and piecewise
methods.
Recitified Linear Unit (ReLU) f(x) = max(0, x) is an-
other popular activation function in neural networks. Applying
ReLU in arithmetic circuits also incurs a huge computation
cost similar to sigmoid functions. If one layer uses ReLU as
the activation function, it needs to execute bni comparisons,
which are even more expensive than verifying the matrix
multiplication. Thus, the square function f(x) = x2 might be
suitable for replacing ReLU in VeriML [24]. Prior results show
that using the square function to replace ReLU can achieve
satisfactory performance (99% accuracy) [24], [3]. However,
using it to approximate softmax fails with the fixed learning
rate. But we notice that it still performs well (93.09% accuracy)
when we use the Adam Optimizer to adjust the learning rate.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented the design, implementation
and evaluation of VeriML, a verifiable and fair outsourced
machine learning service. We transformed machine learning
algorithms to quadratic arithmetic circuits to generate proofs,
then designed a new commit-and-prove protocol to detect
misbehaviors during the training process with high probability.
Blockchain is leveraged to serve as a decentralized trusted third
party to achieve fair exchange by a hash-locked transaction.
Our experiments on real-world datasets validate that the com-
putation and communication costs of VeriML are practical, and
it can be readily applied to the existing MLaaS platforms.
There are some important future directions. First of all, the
efficiency of existing SNARK implementations can be further
improved. The underlying VC protocol can be replaced by
other similar building blocks which have the zero-knowledge
property. Moreover, we will seek for better approximations of
non-linear functions, especially for the diversified non-linear
functions used in many other machine learning algorithms.
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